on ee centre CHAPTER9 SPECIAL RADIOLOGICAL-SAFETY MISSIONS . Special monitoring service was required for transport of radioactive samples to the United States and for tritium transfer during the preshot operations. 9.1 SAMPLE TRANSPORT JTF 132, by means of Operations Order 2-52, designated CTG 132.1 as the responsible agent for radiological safety of pergonnel transporting radioactive samples to the United States. To implementthis directive, the Kwajalein Control Group officer was delegated the responsibility for radiological safety of personnel transporting radioactive samples. He monitored the collection of samples from test aircraft, the packaging of these samples, and the loading of these samples on Military Air Transport Service (MATS) aircraft. He obtained ° monitor escorts for each plane. 9.1.2 Results Owing to a shortage of available monitors and to deviations from scheduled shipments, difficulties were experienced during post-Mike shipments. For example, an incident occurred in which a monitor obtained to escort a shipmentleft the aircraft prior to the arrival of the radioactive shipment at its destination with the statement that he was relieved to get away from the shipment. The psychological impact of this statement upset the aircraft crew to the extent that they felt their welfare was being endangered during the remainder of the trip and so reported on arrival at the homestation. The shipment was packaged so as to eliminate a radioactive hazard and did not present a hazard in this incident, but the circumstances surrounding the action point out a need for a specific group of sample-return monitors responsible to the Rad-Safe Unit for the safe delivery of samples. The remaining eight shipments were returned to Los Alamos, Baltimore, and Boston without incident. 9.1.2 Tritium Monitoring In order to provide for a radiation-safety program during the preshot interval of preparation, Joe B. Webber of H-1 Group, LASL, was designated as special monitor for the tritiumtransfer phases of the operation. His equipment, which consisted of modified air-flow ionization chambersand portable urinalysis sets, aided in the control of the tritium hazards within the cab. No exposures or incidents occurred during this critical operation. Fortunately the tritium monitoring occurred prior to any detonations; therefore airborne residual activity did not discharge the detection elements. A more versatile field detection instrument is desirable. 36 Aenltienen Ae enee eee etmemt oe me tne . .