III for the B-l\7B aircraft was being developed by Eos Alamos. Acting upon these plans, the Special ‘Weapons Command submitted a request to higher levels for the B-l7-type aircraft, but was turned down on 6 February 1952, First, there was not enough ground handling equipment to support the B-l\7 aircraft overseas, production on the aircraft was lagging about nine months, and, finally, the B-7 bomber required at least a 11,000-foot runway for safe operation, This latter point was important because there was only a 6,700-foot runway at Kwajalein Island, Another sampling aircraft had to be found. Task Group 132.) officers began by considering the B.36, the B-l5 bomber, F-89, and F-9) fighter-type aircraft, When data were compiled a conference was held with Los Alamos personnel on 15 February 1952, where Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Ousley, on the planning staff of Task Group 132.4, explained the merits of each aircraft. He discussed availability, performance, runway requirements, communications equipment, maintenance requirements, and reliability, Thereupon, the confrees decided on the huge B-36 bomber, Again, request, went forward to Air Force headquarters.” still the IVY planners had trouble for on 21 February 1952, General Curtis EB, LeMay - declared that B~36 aircraft could not be used because this would interfere with the war plan for the Strategic Air Command, order the other aircraft were eliminated. In rapid The B-l5 was also important to the war plans and, besides, would be unable to operate from the Kwajalein runways with the fuel load it would need to accomplish the sampling missions, Both the F~89 and the F-9l aircraft did not meet 6h ArwiKo SWEH-2 -0034, q? td yilty: