airplanes, and the 2-l7 inter-atoll airlift airplanes.
During the
delays, General kstes also had his staff study the possibilities of get.
ting
Air Task Group aircraft ready for shots fired close in sequence,
The limiting factor, Ceneral Sstes learned, was decontaminating the huge
P-36 bombers,
If the CASTLE shots could be fired on a seven-day schedule,
all aircraft could be ready.
If the shots were five or six days apart,
the Air Task Group could not put up 100 per cent of its aircraft tut
enourmn to support the shot.
The staff worked out a 2h-hour schedule for
decontamination and. maintenance and planned to try it out following ROMEO
Shot.”
:
After twenty days delay, ROMEO fired on 27 March 195i.
The yield was
predicted(ineR:tons but its actual yield was about
Missions transpired without incident,
33
The group tried out its decontam-
ination program and found that, with no undue trouble, personnel could
ready half of the aircraft for another mission within three days, However,
the maintenance priority system was not tried out because of the total
number of aircraft which flew on ROMEO. >
KOON Shot occurred early on the morning of 7 April 195k.
From an
expected yield ofMMAMATTTTTTE tne device prodced
JM, wich caused most of the effects aircraft to fail to gather
data,
The decontamination procedures were again applied and proved
practical, however, the small yield delayed the maintenance priority
system acain,
An F-?l; sampler lost turbine buckets and made a forced
landing on the Bikini airstrip.
Only because the yield was much smaller
109
AFWLUHO
S*EH-2 -003L
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°