SUBJECT:
Conduct of Future Overseas Nuclear Tests
but with exceptions including Operations IVY, WIGWAM and ARGUS.
With
respect to the Eniwetok Proving Ground, this "every other year" concept
has some disadvantages. There have been proposals which it is believed
have considerable validity that our testing concept should permit a
test to be conducted whenever the need is indicated by the development
program. Acceptance of such proposals would require that the Eniwetok
Proving Ground be operated on a continuous basis.
While recognizing
the advantages inherent in a continuous testing concept, it appears
that when a number of tests are involved, the factors of proving ground
location, climatology, and effective use of personnel prove to be most
difficult of accommodation. Even though tests were limited in number
and scheduled throughout the year, it appears that these factors, and
that of weather in particular, would tend to force these individual
efforts, time-wise, into a group or series. Testing under a continuous
concept would probably most logically be accomplished by an organization
and command structure similar to that now in use at Patrick Air Force
Base, yet other considerations are such that the safety, coordination,
support, and control problems associated with a test series would require that ell participating activities be under one head. The Task
Force arrangement for conducting atomic tests is so constituted as to
take advantage of the seasonal Eniwetok weather, to provide coordination of the many activities involved, to provide over-all support required, and to exercise some judgment and influence to keep over~all
costs and commitment of forces to reasonable levels consistent with the
magnitude of the test series. Based on these and other considerations,
I have concluded that the Task Force concept, while not an ideal solu-
tion, is generally sound and should, for the present at least, be contimued unless and until there are firm indications that the United States
will observe a test moratorium for some indefinite extended period of
time.
4.
The remainder of this memorandum is devoted to changes in the
Task Force concept and organization which it is believed will permit
the conduct of nuclear tests in the Eniwetok Proving Ground with greater
economy, efficiency, and harmony.
5. With each succeeding overseas test operation, the scale of the
operation has increased and the number of agencies and personnel involved have also increased. The programs and projects for Operation
HARDTACK were so numerous and varied, became a part of the test program
through so many channels and authorities, were funded and manned from
such a variety of sources as to be almost impossible of proper technical
and administrative management in the proving ground. HARDTACK was further complicated by the sense of urgency resulting from the evident
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