SUBJECT:
Conduct of Future Overseas Nuclear Tests
possibility of a test moratorium. The magnitude of the operation was
increased by the necessity for repeat testing of modified devices which
failed to operate as expected, and because of the necessity for transfer of two of the test detonetions and associated programs from prepared
sites at Bikini Atoll to Johnston Island where construction and other
preparations had not been made. The Task Force was sufficiently flexible
to absorb most of these changes to its original program and to acconmo~
date the additional technical programs approved for implementation after
the operational phase had begun. This capability to accommodate major
changes during the operational phase can be a most important consideration and some flexibility in this regard is essential. However, it is
susceptible of abuse unless a proper procedure is established and observed to assure that the efforts of the test organization are devoted
strictly to the objectives of the operation. Even though the problems
associated with the early appraisal of the test program, strict observance of established procedures for approval of technical programs and
need for control in their implementation are recognized to be great and
the need for flexibility essential, it is believed that positive action |
mist be taken to: (a) Limit the number of detonations scheduled for
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the specific series and (b) Assume more positive control over the number
of experiments, their readiness, sponsorship, and method of conduct.
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Although the greatest problems encountered by the test organization during HARDTACK resulted from changes in the operation after deployment
and were either unavoidable or were clearly necessary in the national
interest, there are certain changes in the current Task Force structure
and procedures which could be made to increase the effectiveness and
economy of the operation.
6. The Task Force Commander and Task Force headquarters should
participate to a very mech greater extent in the planning of an operation. In the past, such participation has been entirely too limited
and actual planning has been accomplished by individuals from various
agencies involved during a time when these individuals had no responsibility to the Task Force for the ultimate success of the operation. The
basic scientific planning function of the Department of Defense is
normally accomplished by the many laboratories and contractors of the
Services in coordination with Headquarters AFSWP. The resulting pregram, when approved by the Department of Defense is referred to Field
Command, AFSWP, for implementation. During this interim or planning
period, Task Force jurisdiction is limited to Task Group 7.2 and Task
Group 7.3 (reduced to a planning staff).
AEC planning is carried out
by the scientific laboratories and the Albuquerque Operations Office
under the general direction of DMA by individuals who are responsible
directly to their respective organizations. While these individuals
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