Redwing chart by the omission of a dotted line caued "Sclentific Supervision" from the AEC to the Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters to Task Groups 7.1 and 7.5. The TG 7.1 organization for Hardtack, shown tn Fig. 3.2, represented a change from the Redwing organization in the following respects: 1, Task Units were reduced from twelve to six by absorbtion of the assembly and documentary photography functions within the major Task Units and by establishing Arming and Firing as a special staff office instead of a Task Unit. Task Units 1 to 4 remained major programmatic Task Units; Task Unit 5 continued to provide all timing and firing and to do some ex- perimental work for Task Units 1, 2 and 3; and Task Unit 6 provided the usual rad-safe services. 2. Additional Deputy Commanders were provided, which somewhat facilitated independent operations in two locations, and later three, when Johnston Island was added. 3. On October 1, 1957, » CTG 7.1, terminated his employment at LASL, Don B. Shuster, of the Sandia Corporation, replaced him as Task Group Commander. As a result, each of the five major Task Units was represented in the Command Section. Neither the Commander nor any of a UN shot, which failed to materialize. Because of the purpose and na- of the deputies performed any special Task Group functions for their parent organizations. 4. During the operational phase, Task Unit 7 was added to take care ture of the shot, the limited amount of data to be acquired, and the fact that much of the preparation was outside the Task Force organization, Task Unit -; 7 bore little resemblance to any of the others. Command relationships were closer to the military pattern than they were to those for operations at the Nevada Test Site. However, one impor- tant difference from normal military command relationships was that the TG 7.1 concept of operations and operation plans stemmed from the device and weapon programs and experimental programs of the Laboratories and the DOD, over the composition and extent of which the Task Group and Task Force had little or no control. In the normal military operation the com- mander formulates plans from the very beginning of the operation; the plans of subordinates stem from these. Because of these differences and since support of the TG 7.1 effort was among the principal functions of the Task Force and other Task Groups, their plans and operations depended in many ways on those of 7.1. The Commander, JTF 7, authorized direct relationships among the various Task Groups once he had established policy and major items of support. Relationships of TG 7.1 with the Joint Task Force and with the other Task Groups were good and resulted in generally excellent support for the accomplishment of 7.1 missions. Relationships within TG 7.1 were close and cordial. During the planning stage the Task Group Commander and members of his staff made fre- quent visits to the Field Command, AFSWP, and UCRL, and to Program and Project sites as necessary, to get first-hand information on plans and requirements and to ensure operational feasibility, safety, coordination, and adequate support. Many visitors were received from the Task Units, Pro- grams and Projects. Necessary meetings were held at locations most convenient for the bulk of the participants -- Los Alamos, Albuquerque, Liver61 AFWL/HO bo