other Pacific operations combined, was conducted on virtuaiuy the same time scale as earlier tests indicates that despite problems the organization func- tioned efficiently. Most of the problems which arose during the course of the operation originated because of the split responsibility status of Project Officers and senior Laboratory representatives (Task Unit Commanders). The Project Of- ficer or Task Unit Commander is charged by his home organization with the responsibility of carrying out an assigned scientific task. This individual's career progression depends to some extent on how well this task is accom- plished. On the other hand,the same individual is also a member of the Task Force, and therefore is subject to the direction of Task Group and Task Force command elements. These directions are not always compatible with those received from the Laboratory or home agency. Problems which arose from such causes were subjected to on-the-spot arbitrary solutions in the interest of "getting the job done."" These solutions were not necessarily the most satisfactory from the standpoint of those concerned. It is recommended that prior to the field phase of future operations clear-cut understandings be reached between the Laboratory or agency management and Task Group or Task Force command elements regarding division of authority and channels of communication to field personnel. It is not entirely clear that the Hard- tack organization offers the best possible solution to the conduct of a Pacific test operation. Prior to another operation the entire organization picture should be fully explored by all participating agencies. . Operational Limitations - Because of the fallout difficulty of firing shots of large yield, operational limitations imposed by experimental programs can seriously jeopardize an entire test schedule. Special attention should be devoted in technical planning to means for reducing or eliminating as many factors as possible which could impose limitations as to when, how, or where ‘ a shot can be fired. Radiochemical sampling by aircraft imposes, more non-fallout associ- ated operational limitations on the firing of average developmental shots than does any other experiment or program. In addition, it imposes a heavy support load on Task Force or supporting elements. It is recommended that the development of a simple, reliable, inexpensive rocket or drone sampling system be vigorously pursued. Personnel and Morale — Experienced and skilled scientific :personnel are the most valuable single asset associated with the nuclear testing capability. In general, less money is spent for attention devoted to these personnel than is devoted to the maintenance, shipment, and protection of the equipment they design. A great many of these people have participated in many consecutive test series, and each participation involves a considerable sacri- fice in personal comfort and family life. The skills and talents that these people possess are in considerable demand in other fields of endeavor, and the end of each operation finds a not insignificant number realizing that they can find an equally interesting and probably more lucrative job which does not require the personal sacrifices and discomfort of nuclear testing. When compared to those available to most of these people in any part of the United States, quarters and recreational facilities at EPG are entirely substandard. Most personnel have no objections to living under such conditions for relatively short periods of time, but when this is stretched to several months or many consecutive operations, such facilities become unsatisfactory. It is recommended in future operations either that provisions be 114 AFWL/HO //3