vember 25, 1957. ‘hese nine documents were reproducea by J-1, TG 7.1, together with TG 7.1 tmplementing instructions and distributed to the staff and subordinate units on December 13, 1957. This file constituted the CTG 7.1 security policy for the operation. Predeparture Security Indoctrination. A joint Security Indoctrination Letter for Task Groups 7.1 and 7.5 was published on December 23, 1957. This letter established the procedures to be used in the instruction of personnel planning to participate in the operation. It was issued with the con- currence of CJTF 7 and incorporated both the requirements of the AEC Security Manual, Vol. 2000, and JTF 7 SOP 205-2, "Basic Security Indoctrination." Each Hardtack participant was required to acknowledge in writing that he had read the indoctrination letter. A certificate to this effect was forwarded with his request for travel orders, and the signed copy was required before travel orders were issued. Adjutant General's office. All statements were filed in the cognizant Transmission of Classified Documents in Personal Custody of Individ- uals. With JTF Seven SOP 205-4, "Courier Instructions," as a guide, an appendix to an annex of the Administrative Plan No. 1-57 was published on November 1, 1957. This appendix incorporated all courier instructions for transmission of documents and material between EPG and other locations, and within the EPG. Although procedures were not always followed in that written authority was not always obtained prior to couriering classified documents, no security violations were observed. The problems present during past operations in the shipment of bulky classified materials through the mail were not evident during Hardtack. This resulted from adequate planning and coordination with Customs by TG 7.5 prior to the operational period. . Access to Restricted Data. Joint Task Force Seven SOP 205-3, "Se- - curity Clearances," specified prerequisites for access to Restricted Data. The exchange of RD between military and civilian personnel of DOD and AEC personnel (including personnel of AEC contractors) required certification of each DOD individual possessing a military clearance. No travel orders were issued on these individuals until proper certification was on file with TG 7.5. Two certifying areas were established: Certifying officers at Los Alamos processed headquarters and Task Units 1, 2; 4, 5, and 6; certifying officers at FC, AFSWP, Sandia Base, processed TU-3. During Castle all TG 7.1 personnel requiring access had been certified, with the concurrence of CTG 7.1, by CJTF 7. During Redwing and Hardtack this responsibility was delegated to the Military Executive, J-1, and to FC, AFSWP, with a minimum number of alternates, which resulted in a vast improvement over the JTF 7 certification in efficiency, facility, and control. Exclusion Areas. Joint Task Force Seven SOP 205-6 directed the establishment of policies and procedures on exclusion areas. Access was pred- icated on the Sigma category indicated on the security badge and on the ‘need to know." Access lists for each exclusion area were published, and exchange badges were maintained for each individual requiring continuing access, Certain individuals were authorized to grant temporary access. The system utilized was generally satisfactory, except that it often be- came unwieldy because of numerous changes. Initially, task units submitted the names of their personnel who required access to exclusion areas. Opera- tional and other requirements and frequent personnel substitutions increased 106 7! AFWL/HO -