oh eb
Upon the conclusion of Dr. McGrath's presentation, General
Cutler complimented him on the high quality of his report, and advised the Council that the purpose in hearing this factual presentation was to remind members of the Council of the basic facts relating to shelter prior to Council consideration next week of the report of the Interdepartmental Committee entitled "Measures to Carry
Out the Concept of Shelter" (NSC 5807).
The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization inquired
of Dr. McGrath the number of casualties estimated in Dr. McGrath's
discussion of Operation Sentinel.
Dr. McGrath replied that the cas-
ualties were estimated at about 82 million.
Mr. Stans, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, pointing out the arbitrary level of tolerance of radiation which Dr. McGrath
head set at 75 Roentgens, inquired what was the general range of toler-
ance in human beings.
Dr. McGrath explained that the Pigure of 75
Roentgens had been selected because this intake of radiation would
not make many people sick and accordingly unfit to work.
A dose of
200 Roentgens, on the other hand, would cause disabling sickness.
Admiral Strauss commented that the natives on some of the
islands in our Pacific proving grounds, and some of our own U. &.
personnel there, had undergone much larger doses than 75 Roentgens
without serious il] effect.
The President inquired how one could distinguish the degree of contamination from radioactive fallout in a given area at a
given time. Mr. Shafer, of the FCDA, explained that it was proposed
to distribute instruments for this purpose immediately after a nuclear detonation.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Federal Civil
Defense Administration, concurred in generally by the
Atomic Energy Commission, on the hazards of radioactive
fallout and on the relative effectiveness of types of
protective shelter.
2.
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION
(NSC Action No. 1642-£; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated March 14, 1958)
Having done a lot of hard work on this intelligence estimate, the intelligence community, explained Mr. Allen Dulles, was
still of the opinion that the Soviet Union did have a propram of
civil defense and of air-raid shelter construction.
It was not easy
to pin down and describe this program, but Mr. Dulles said that he
would be glad to invite skeptics into his office to see the enormous
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