all edditional. However, soze of the above night be utilized at ENIWETOE to improve the evacuation capabilities there, Substantially, Situatien II and ITI as compared to REDWING might result in one less carrier, two less ATFts, alevan less helicopters ang ons additianal LSD. If carrier is required at EXIWETOK for evacuation of helicopters and light aircraft it would not result in one less carrisr. In the event that Situation II and TII were indicated ty the AR, the securing of the majfar support itens ia believed to be no preblen, With Situation I, however, where considerable additional support items are required it is doubt2ul if they could be cotcined without a very high level decision. 2e Op erations a. Operationally, it is believed that the TACHGI site is subject to nang problems and adverso conditions. Among the principle ones are the insbllity to negotiates the lagoon with anything larger than am LOU and the questionable movancnt of the barge from LSD to moorings by Wy, Coupling the above with the cther problem; of limited tims eccess (Zeur hours day and four hours night) te the lsgoon, rovgi seas dslaying barge turn around avid ship-te-shore movements, wind delays, technicel ani tining delays, it is my opinion that even with two LSD's one would be very opticistic to get even m eight dar Mring schedule. The precicted poor exchange rato of the water in the Irgoon end the dimensions of the atoll, which is mich aculles than ENTUETOK and ~18 =