PAGE 3 RHWNEAAQOO UNCLAS////EYES ONLY////
1N SOME DIFFICULTY DUE TO TYPHOON OLGA AND ASKED WHETHER MAG 36 SHOULD
CONTINUE WITH ITS DEPLOYMENT PLANS. ROGER ADVISED THAT, IN HIS JUDGMENT, |
iT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MESSION COULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT ENIWETOK
AS EARLY AS NOV, Ta LT. COL. ROBINSON INFORMED HIM THAT 1T WAS FEASIBLE
FOR THE CH-53 HELICOPTERS TO STAGE FROM KWAJALETN AND ASKED WHETHER {tT
> woute BE REASONABLE, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT, FOR THEM TO COME ANEAD ON
APPROXIMATELY NOV, 1 AND REMAIN AT KWAJALEIN UNTIL ENTWETOK COULD
RECEIVE THEM, HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED KWAJALEIN
WHETHER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND ASKED RAY
TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT QUESTION. ROGER ADVISED LT. COL. ROB INSON THAT
HE COULD NOT ANO WOULD NOT MODIFY THE EXISTING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT
REQUEST BUT THAT HE WOULD SEE TO IT THAT AN APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION
TO THE REQUEST WAS SENT TO CINCPAC, LATE THAT SAME EVENING, CAPT
MCOYER OF THE FIRST MARENE AIR WING 1N JAPAN TELEPHONED RAY AT KWAJALEIN
TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDENG WITH MAG 36, THESE
TwO TELEPHONE CALLS,
NEITHER OF WHICH WAS ORIGINATED BY ROGER RAY, WERE HIS ONLY DIRECT
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE HELICOPTER RESOURCES, THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, HE RECEFVED AN INFORMATION COPY OF A FIRST MARINE AIR WING MESSAGE
TO COM, SEVENTH FLEET, WHEREIN HE, RAY, WAS BADLY MESQUOTED AS TO THE
EXTENT OF STORM DAMAGE AT ENIWETOK. HE, THEREFORE, ORIGENATED A