gathering possibilities of the shot.
The task is indeed
formidable.
7. My staff and I have held further discussion with
parties interested in this shot in the Washington area.
The
Army has indicated informally that it could have personnel and
equipment at West Coast ports of aerial embarkation on thirty
(30) days notice.
AFOAT-1 has indicated a strong desire to do
this high altitude experiment during Operation REDWING since
its personnel and equipment are already deployed.
A major
effort would be required by AFOAT~-1 to deploy necessary equipment and personnel for a 1957 test.
Sandia Corporation has
indicated that it could supply the desired warhead on about six
weeks notice.
In this connection, Sandia Corporation is already
working on a design.
Dr. Edward Teller visited me, and he is
very strongly in favor of doing the shot in Operation REDWING.
8. In recapitulation I believe that the following points
must be weighed:
a. The time between now and July 15, 1956 is short and
if the high altitude test is included in REDWING, it would
be necessary to lay on the Operation with great dispatch.
b. The amount of weapons effects or basic scientific
data that can be obtained from the tests in REDWING will
be limited due to inadequate time to prepare instrumentation.
It will not be possible to make use of closein airborne instrumentation in the time available.
Instrumentation will be limited to that which is possible
from the ground with possibly some limited observation
from orbiting aircraft.
Scientific opinion is not
unanimous on the value of the weapons effects information
that can be obtained with the limited instrumentation,
c. Comments from Drs. Bradbury and York indicate that
the formation of the acoustic signal
inm high altitude
shot has not been fully explored and further, theoretical
studies should provide additional information on the high
altitude burst phenomenon which should make possible more
reliable estimates on the yields and heights of burst
appropriate for the test.