:
follow this procedurc for the remainder of the operttion even though
weather communicttions aboard the command ship had been satisfactorily
improved.
LCDR Masterson and Lt “Vinchaster would go aboard the command
ship several days prior to cach and return to Eniwetok when the Commander, JTF SEVEN moved his command back to Parry Island,
During the long deley prior to the ROMEO Event the Commander, Task
Group 7.4 expressed the need for weather forecasts farther in advance
than the forty-eight hour forecasts normally issued.
Because of mainte~
nance problems it was necessary that the aircraft assigned to units
under his command be flown frequently until two days prior to the shet.
In order to schedule these flights it was necessary to know nore than
two days in advance which day was likely to be favorable for the mde.
To fulfill this need a seventy-two hour outlook was made a part of the
daily weather bricfings presented to Brigadier General Estes; although,
the forecasters had very little confidence in their ability to predict
the upper level winds that far in advance,
On 13 March 1954 Lt Col Slater presented a bricfing to 2 group of
VIPs, including Scnator Pastore, Representative Hollificnd, Gencral
Rawlins, and Lt, General Powers,
They were given the latcst forecast
for the ROMO vent, followed by a discussion of the foreeast for BRAVO
and the verificatiun of that forceast.
It was also explained to the
group that for future shots at Bilini cnly winds aloft with a definite
component from the south would be acceptable.
On 21 ifarch Dr, Zdward Toller, of UCRL and Lt Col V. Smith, J-3,
JTF SEVEN, visited the Task Force Weather Centril.,
Major Stopinski
gave them a complete bricfing on the netheds of weather forecasting in
4
Gld