TOP -VCRE The Secretary of State seid that the Derense pro. ams 166 foreign policy implications. He hoped that ne decisions wou made on the Defense poposa. without uisowing the Peparwment of “tate our forces out of Korea, Ireside t the mixht atart 4 Wu: ta. more time to consider these political implications. ou. toe ifenge presentation, General Randall oa: said that the Department © “até would have the job of making redeployment of | S ferses x -aptatue to foreign countries. However, vecretary Dulles saia t wa. 1 clear just what was meant, in specific terms, by (he propos. ¥ deployments. The Department of itate would need to study uo taiies plans for redeployment befcre ‘t couid comment usefrl. 2. ce po litical implications Secretary Duuesr’ ummediate rea tid war UOH? it would be better to reduce tne size ff our divisions inrvs than to mull these divisions out de said that 1: we omlie 4 would certainly not »e sconcut #3): penditures. adurtter Pog, ‘ » > Secretary Dulles tre: ii tuat wow-leves mi ota: “t cers frequently carried out 4 mi itary program witn whan tse) ssc not agree, in such a way as tc cus: maxiomm poli':ca. emna rass ment. In the case of redeploymerts, i: the rumor that we were iu. ing out of Germany, for exampl:, pecame current, ‘le. ‘o,f: might win the election toer’ surouner we wouad nach 4m rE forces. Secretary Dulles velt ¢ was important ' 0 ma.tutes. Nae and Marine Corps capabilities ~o rope with new crises smyrm coe world. He said that the mopilit o” these fortes, and tu & that they did not need to have p- rminent bases on Torus. -? tory, meant that we could piace «reat reliance on when + +> action in the "trouble spots" capabilities of the Navy an tirelh clear to hin. * tn w cid “er we ror rad However en lp oe k Secretary Dulles was canvinied that Govict stantly increasing. [f the USSR ve-s tne impression power is declining, it will be encorraged to keep up expenditures in spite of thriz m den o1 tae Sune | uw 63 tna: oon ec. + ice Secretary Dulles oncludec py repeating -ne u de uk long-range decisions on !' . mil tary programs would * “a.+. 4 til the Department of State was a°fc rded an opportim * the political implications f “ne moponed srogrem amoSeRET REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOBER LIBRARY Secretary Dulles vhe: warmec shat ou* a. .128 on, willing to supply sufficien’. ind! genous forces % ‘ompennK:: reductions or redeployments cof ' 3 fcrces He sali . a tual Security Program shouL. mo» ediucea. toe Univers “tate: dia! have to increase its forces t+ ‘1 spenge.e fo ro oube A: ous forces overseas. letesa see nn Ge SME ta ct Fite te