.ES tageZe Tea from the exterior of the wekicle. On the other hand, contamination within a vehicle would more probably be picked up by personnel than if it were on the outside. Further, it is recognized that significantly high concentra- tions of radioective fallout may accumulate in such parts as the air filters of an mitomobile. Again, this hes to be weighted against the probability plus the fact that it is relatively difficult to monitor such parts on a mass basis. The uncertainties present in estimating possible hazards from vehicle contamination would not justify fine distinctions in monitoring the varicus parts. A thcrough cleaning, inside and outside, would yerapegeelgert me that they will be handled before the activity has decreased to low levels i, appear to be the best soltcticn. One of the obvious ways to avoid mech of the problem discussed in Criteria IV ig to prevent vehicles entering en crea during the tine of fallout. This will not prevent the first vehicles passing through from picking up activity on the tires from the highvwey. It is believed, hou- ever, this will not comsvitute such a troublesore problem and trast exper= Zence has indicated thet the activity found on the tires noticessly decreased after several cers hed passed over the highway. Further, if vehicles are not present in the fallout it will help reduce contamination of the passengers and of the insides of the velicles. OperationalFeasibsity and at a later time 20 mr/hr (gamma), inside a vehicle. This resulted in washing about 75 cars (roughly 1/8 of the total monitored) following the seventh and ninth detonations of Upshot-Knothole. Under the recom~ mendations given in Criteria IV, the bus mentioned above, but probably none of the cars, would have been washed, - 45- coe c+ ee cee In the past, the criteria used for washing cars has been 7 mr/hr,