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for maximum permissible cose, as well as
length of stay within the arca of contaminalion. With knowledze of the magnitude of
the radiation levels present aud the rate of
' decay, (t)—'?, it is possible to plan and
execute a short stay even in a highly conftamineted area. Planning for continuous
occupancy recuires more extensive analysis. The following data mayaid in such

evaluation.

The fallout 1nap and Table II suggest the

Tortie

degree of radiation exposure received in
continuous occupancy under normalliving
conditions beginning with the time of initial fallout. For those entering the con-

_taminated zone four montis after the first
fallout, however, and then living there

jndefinitely, the area encompassed by the
50-r effective biological isodose line will

have shrunk from about 25,000 to 2,500

square mites.

At such time (four months

after fallout), an area of about 1,000

‘square miles within the 50-r isodose line
might have the highest residual contamination, amounting to about three times the
dose rates at the periphery.

The 0.3 r

per week cut-of-doors isodose-rate line
mivht extend to about the same position
zs the bne marked 50 on the map.

As one attempts to extrapolate such
data te one year after fallout, the analysis

becomes still niore difficult and uncertain.
Yhe data suggest, however, that if return
is postponed to one year aiter fallout, the
59-r effective biological isodose line will
have disappeared. On the basis of these
coiservative estimates, the 1,000 square

miles of highest contanunation might have
en out-of-doors dose rate of about + r per
week after one year. Similarly, personnel
might accumulate a dose of about 100 for
the first year following exposure and an
additional 90 r over the next three years,

‘independent of the biological recovery factor.

It is to be expected that this factor

would be relatively great for such long

periods of time, thus reducing the effective
biological dose below 50 r. The 0.3 r
per week out-of-doors isodose-rate line
might encompass an area somewhat larger
than the line marked 400 on the map.

Ae

rye

593

GaxstA RADIATION ExrosureS FROM J'ALLOUT

Vel. 66

(The weathering factor for the islands in

the Pacific has been greater than the as-

sumed value for large land masses, so that
at one year the out-of-doors dose rate on
these islands was less, by a factor oi alinmost 2, than would be predicted by tiie
method sugested here.)
The forcgoing anaivses are bascd on
passive factors only, not taking into account the actions of persens themselves in
reducing contamination. If, for example,

a permanent retuum into an area were post-

poned for one year after fallout, the radio-

logical situation would probably have bcen

adequately appraised, and decontatmina-

tion operations initiated.

Moreover, with

the return of a populace into a knowncontaminated area, more than normal pre-

cautions might be expected in regard to

occupancy of the more protective types of

buildings and reduction of time spent outcf-doors.
It appears not unreasonable to assume

that the theoretical out-of-doors dose rates

for the areas of highest residual contamu-

nation, calculated by means of the extrap-

olations given above, actually mugiit he

many times reduced. The data thus
suggest that, with this type of detonation,

continual occupaney even of the most
heavily contaminated area need be prohibited for only about one year.
The task of evaluating radiation exposures from fallout is fraught with uncertainties, and one instinctively shrinks from
proposing criteria based on such variables
and intangibies. Yet we would be doing
ourselves a disservice if we did not attempt
an analysis of the relevant factors and incorporate

them

into

some

conceptual

scheme as indicated here. The analytical
approaches, and certainly the quantitative
values suggested, are not to be considered

precise but are intended, rather, to give
order-of-nagnitude estimates. It is believedthat they are, in general, conserva-

tive, t.e., they do not underestimate the
potential hazards involved.
Division of Biology and Medicine
U.S. Atomic Eucrgy Corumissioa
Washington, D, C.

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