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General Cutler asked Secretary Dulles whether the procedure
just proposed by Secretary Quarles did not meet Secretary Dulles' argument. Secretary Dulles replied that he didn't think that it quite did,
because as he saw it, under Secretary Quarles’ proposal the State Department did not bave a chance to express its own views until the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already crystallized. Secretary Quarles then suggested the holding of a preliminary conference
between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after
which the Joint Chiefs would get down to work. Secretary Quarles
pointed out that what the Joint Chiefs would present to the National
Security Council on March 15 was only a plan for the study of forces
for limited military operations, and not the study itself.
The President commented that in any event the JUS plan
would have to go to the NSC Planning Board before it was considered
by thé National Security Council.
The President and General Cutler
‘both agreed on the desirability of the conference between the Joint
Chiefs and State, suggested by Secretary Quarles, before actual work
on the study was commenced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Allen Dulles inquired whether covert operations would
be included in such a study. The President replied facetiously that
he, of course, had no knowledge of covert operations.
Secretary Dulles then stated that he had one more question.
He felt that the Defense Department comment on the original Gaither
Panel recommendation seemed to prejudge in a negative sense the validity of the Panel's recommendation. This might prove to be correct,
but the matter should not be prejudged. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles
recommended that the terms of reference of the JCS study should be
broad enough to permit at least the consideration of the Gaither Panel
recommendation in favor of augmenting our forces for limited operations
as opposed to merely augmenting the capabilities and readiness of such
forces.
The President said he was inclined to believe that in general the important thing was to augment the capabilities of our forces for limited war rather than increasing the size of such forces.
He did not believe that the Gaither Panel recommendation was well
set forth in calling for an augmentation of U. S. forces for limited
military operations. However, the President expressed agreement with
Secretary Dulles that the terms of reference of the JCS study should
be broad enough to include consideration of whether to augzent the
size of our forces for limited operations. The President pointed out
that we had been earnestly arguing for the augmentation of the capabilities of the military forces of the Republic of Korea, while at
the same time we were seeking to cut down the force levels of the
ROK armed forces.
The National Security Council:
-k.
'
(OP SECRET