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NSC Planning Board. Thus the state of Israel was in fact the darling of Jewry throughout the world, and world Jewry was a formidable
force indeed. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Department of Defense on the subject of a settlement, as well as the
letter which Secretary Dulles had received from Secretary Quarles in
December (peremptory in tone), were simply not realistic.
This Ad-
ministration had gone further in trying to moderate the policy and
position of Israel, and to show greater sympathy for the Arabs, than
any previous U. S. Administration. On the other hand, there were
certein courses of action which simply could not be followed, from
the domestic political point of view. When the state of Israel had
been established, both the Department of State and the Department
of Defense had been in agreement that the establishment of Israel,
in the circumstances, would inevitably lead to the situation in the
Near East which now confronts us. Nevertheless, the warnings and
advice of the Departments of State and Defense had been ignored.
The best proof of the potency of international Jewry is
‘ that the Soviet Union, while constantly hinting to the Arab states
that it will agree to help the Arabs to dismember Israel, has never.
actually come out publicly with such a statement of support. The Soviets rely on hints, and they are playing the game very cautiously
despite the great prize which they could win in the Near East if
they supported the destruction of Israel. Accordingly, if the USSR
doesn't dare to tackle this situation forthrightly, other nations
must approach the problem with care too. Among all of our allies,
not a single one would support the policy toward Israel which the
Arabs are demanding. There is no situation in the world to which
this Administration has given more thought than the Arab-Israeli
dispute. There are very grave problems to be faced. There is no
greater danger to U. S. security. Perhaps, indeed, the USSR will
ultimately get control of the Near East; but, in any event, there
has been no tendency whatsoever to minimize this danger in the State
Department over the last ten years. Secretary Dulles went on to say
that he had searched his mind for a formula for ending Arab-Israeli
hostility which had some prospect of sticking. In fact, he had pre-
sented one such formulas in his speech of August 26, 1955.
Neither
side--the Arabs or the Israelis--would budge one inch from its position in order to approach the terms of this particular formula. The
situation was tragic and disturbing. We are confronted with a clear
threat to the security of the United States, and we cannot present a
clean-cut practical solution. Accordingly, we are in fact reduced
to following the old British formula of "muddling through”.
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this formula it can at least be said that it has worked after a
fashion and has enabled us to maintain friendly relations thus far
with Seudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. In short, while the
situation was precarious, it was not presently desperate.
"f°. DOP SECRET