plan for Operation IVY was acting in accordance with the recommendation of the National Security Council which recommended a low pressure public information program concerning all aspects of the fall 1952 Eniwetok tests, DISCUSSION 4, Personal mail censorship program would provide some "insulation" against the "I was there" problem which was reflected in several of the "eye-witness accounts” appearing in the press following Operation IVY and would allow supervisory per-~ sonnel of the Task Force an opportunity to assure that all personnel were completely aware of what information concerning the Task Force Operations could be disclosed on an unclassified basis. 5. Censorship on the other hand, no matter how vigorously applied, cannot of itself, safeguard information concerning the tests following the return of Task Force personnel from the Proving Ground. Classified information in the possession of personnel returning from Eniwetok could be compromised if Task Force personnel were not diligent in observing the security instructions since the security program in the end rests in the personal discretion of the individuals to whom the information has been entrusted, Indiscretions on the part of the returning personnel could defeat a censorship program, sorship would not, of course, In addition, cen- prevent the press from speculating on activities of the Task Force at the Proving Ground since the magnitude of the tests, i.e., movement of ships and personnel, tend to identify reasonably well the operational phase. connection the Commission announzed on April 2, 1953, In this that to accommodate the rapidly expanding program of developing and testing new and improved nuclear weapons, ~5- the Pacific Proving Appendix "A"