STANDARD FORM NO. 64 sf REPROD! UCEO man *--ument consists of _L 4 AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES. CHIVES of 2WeEvASS pares ~LASSIFICATIEce Office Mimolw* UNITED STAT] PAUTIONIE NEN Lo wae eV ‘e To ave. wette oak r x nsweer ae : 7. peaie &f12/73 DATE: ec THIG tape Eee heal! t oeNTeenTaina RESTRICTED than Otro. FROM: WAS RELat pee ACT OF 1aag peAQTA POTD te ay SUBJECT: Recollections re Bikinimeyr',- 0! its ee NOR tu / Car RNS Doe o Zmierstion: You raised various aquesticna re Bivini. These rre answered below, with the information I have in my head. Better answers could be obtained from Admiral Persons, on from Dr. H. P. Scoville, Rm. 2A314, Pentegon (re radioactivity), Comdr. Vaux of Office of “aval Reaearch (re remote detection as by eprth shock), or Comdr. Roger Revelle (Navy ext. 2060) re analysis of mud. 1. Bikin* Lafoon was entirely deserted for meny months in the sutumn of 1946 en* the first few months of 1947. It wae in charre of officials located at Kwajelein, about CO miles away. 2. Seismic methods were unable to detect Test Able at any annreciable distance. 3. ty determining radioactive materials in the air, it was found possible, according to some vnhysicists, to detect Pest Able in western USA; but according to other ochysicists, the signal to noise ratio was not sufficient to accomplish such detectione~ using the imperfect equivment and procedures then -vailable. 4. Seismic methods were able to detect Test Baker. My recollection is that sensitivity wes sufficient for making the detection at several thousand miles. But it is my recollection also that fetection in this instance does not necessarily mean distinguishing an atomic bomb exnlosion from netural seismic effects. 5. A fair fraction of the radioactive materials in Test Baker were thrown into the air, and drifted to leeward. It is my recollection that the velue of this fraction was Cetermined with very unsatisfactory accuracy; also that detection of the exrlogion by measuring amount of radioactive Materials in air was found not to be feasible at distance of, sry, a fer thousand miles. 6. Some analyses were made,s'ortly after each explosion, tr show the efficiency of the bomb; t»ese analyses were canable of revealing the identity of the fissionable material used. It is my impression also that, in the year-later expedition to Ritini, further analyses were mode, canable of s owing the efficiency dnd the identify of the ficsionable material. I do not know whether any analyses of this time were made on radioactive materials found svnecifically in the mad, ee & In the three-day conference starting Feb. 3, 1947, on the results of Operation Crossroads, it was brought out very clearly thet the remote detection vroblem is a complicated one. Digtinguishing signels from noise is a major question. Also, some methods might show sugrestion that an atomic bomb exnlosioy hae occurred, but not vroof; other methods might be good for proof once the suggestion had been advanced. Some ~ethods might s*ow the existence, but not the location, of an atomic exnlosim. A full answer involves many kinds of information. The whole matter is beyond the extent of my !mowledge. One woulé do well to confer with the nereons mentioned above, or with Dr.E. Ss. Gilfillen, Technical Mrector of the Joint Cros-roa‘s Committee. DE EG tasar _ pack I REPOSITORY NARA Cotley COLLECTION RG 326 her Files Boxno —! FOLDER B Ky TLS ts STRATIVE MARKING 5, Section 6-10 S» parogeH4 --- 2 ood _ NAD 73 /bb Lae snaeyy By Lt um BEST COPY AVAILABLE gy 334

Select target paragraph3