ANNEX I
Listed below are the ineffective justifications we have used to gq late
for further nuclear tests, and the reactions which they invite: (not m y own views)
a.
We test to retain nuclear superiority in the absence of
disarmament.
What kind of superiority?
destroy each other and the world.
Both sides now have enough to
Why seek more, and what gpod
is superiority in destruction when both die?
We consistently proclaim that we do excel.
Mutual
cessation would maintain American superiority, since clandestine
Russian tests can always be detected even by our present methpds.
We never deny that they can.
Why not we?
b.
~
Particularly when tests are harmful to all life.
Past tests have brought great progress.
progress.
Toward what end?
c.
Russia, though inferior, will stap.
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We must test fqr more
More destruction?
We have enough.
We must test to develop defensive weapons.
What are they?
Any weapon is defensive if so used.
[We
never define the term or explain what we mean.
d.
We must develop discriminating weapons, whose effects pre
confined to military targets.
This begins to make sense, but what are the implicatipns
of such weapons?
The military never talks in terms of discrimination
or restraint, but always in terms of destruction.
They are not really
interested in discrimination, and we civilians therefore cannot|trust
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