therefrom.
Only when we modify present nuclear national policies i h the
light of changed conditions, know ourselves as a nation what they aré¢ » and
express them with obvious resolution to the world can we hope to reg ain
the initiative.
Test cessation is the immediate, the obvious, and the
most
Experience shows the justifications we have used for continuin;
tests to be ineffective.
Wt
disastrous threat.
I have listed them in Annex I, together with 1 the
reactions which they evoke.
I do not concur myself with all these rections,
but they frequently arise.
Many of our highest government officials as well as our own ci tLzens
are not convinced that we must continue tests.
Many of those who st iil
support our official position do so on faith rather than by conviction.
Consequently I hold that unti
the highest policy levels use these arguments we will continue to los
La
kind of approach outlined in this memo.
Vv
has been my experience that doubters are invariably convinced by th
It
on the test issue, and that cessation is a matter of time.
Our own official disarmament position reacts to our testing
disadvantage.
By agreeing to test suspension at all and under any
conditions we admit tacitly that tests are bad and should be stopped.
By tying them into a package we appear to be using an issue that affe cts
the health of all mankind, (according to effective Russian propaganda)
as sugar to make our package more palatable to the Russians, a pac kage
so complex and devoid of public understanding that even our own