TOP SECRET
such assertions, but the question showed the widespread belief in our
country that we are competing among ourselves rather than with the
Russians.
|
Mr. Holaday informed the President that there was very little rivalry to be observed in the PROJECT VANGUARD program. The President cautioned Mr. Holaday to watch this problem of inter-service
rivalry all the time. The objective of the program was not to achieve
a missile which a particular service desired, but instead to achieve
the most efficient missiles system. The President felt that such matters as deployment, the character of the ground installations, methods
of employment desired by the different military services, and similar
matters, were completely secondary to the determination by the United
States to fire a 1500-mile missile and hit something. The President
emphasized that he was interested first of all in achieving such a
vehicle, and that nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of
getting it.
Thereafter, the President stressed once again the great political and psychological advantage of the first achievement of an
IRBM and an ICBM. He noted that from the inception of the ballistic
missiles program the Council had agreed that these political and psychological considerations were perhaps even more important than the
strictly military considerations.
REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. BISENHOWER LEBRARY
,
ee
The Vice President referred to numerous press reports about
inter-service rivalry and lack of adequate support for the U. S. satellite and missiles programs. He warned again thet we would be in
for a very rough time when the Congress began investigating these
rumors and reports. The Congressional investigators would light on
every shred of evidence indicating undue delay or rivalry among the
services. If they think that they have proved the existence of these
obstacles, they will force on us a single-missile program whether we
like it or not.
The Vice President then referred to Mr. Lerson's earlier
remarks about the United States being first in the field on the next
great break-through. In this connection he pointed out that the ICEM
had been built up as the great ultimate weapon. The Russians felt
that they had to possess an ICHM in order to frighten us.
But the
TREM can be much more dangerous to the Russians than the ICHEM to us.
Accordingly, the IRBM is of extreme importance in the propaganda of
the cold war.
-l-
TOP SECRET
we
Mr. Holaday pointed out to the President that, after all,
the development of ground support equipment for the missile must be
carried along with the development of the missile itself. Otherwise
we would end up having the missile but with no suitable installation
from which to shoot it. Nevertheless, our main effort was, of course,
to get the missile.