oh
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“4,
OF
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In this connection, it. would also.be| very. desirable
to make the announcement in the context of a series of
tests being conducted, rather than make anannouncement
- ahout a particular test.
It is possible, bub. unlikely, that the Soviets might
choose to make an announcement concerning the first of
the tests in the series of such 4 character that this
Government might find it necessary to counter with its
cum statement hefore the conclusion of the series.
2.6 with respect to II (hb) Lor Facts Eearing on the Problem
and Discussion see Annex T/—
oo
The circumstances and context in which Sovict announcemont or action in the thornonucleear field might cccur and
the content of such Sovict announcement cannot be foreseen at
this time. The Discussion in annex II develops some of the
contingencies that might occur and suggests, tentatively,
the manner in which these contingcencics might be dealt with.
It is concluded that the circumstances prevailing at jee
time, if it comes, of Soviet thermonuclear tests and/o
announcement thercof will dictate the action to he taken.
3.
With resoect to-II (c)
The Pancl has no conclusions to offer, at this time,
concerning the public reporting of thermonuclear developments subsequent to.the Fall test.
.recosnizes that this
aspect of its terms of reference should he the subject of
continuing study ty the Pancl and should be reported on as
feasible.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
‘th respect to II (a)
The Panel recommends thet:
4. The general operating plan for the public
reporting of the IVY tests, assuming that there is no
UTES