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Soviets gct to feel that the United States was weakening in its de-
termination to maintain the alternative of force, Governor Staessen
warned that they would surely take advantage of this evidence of
weakness.
The National Security Council:
a.
Io"
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Discussed the subject on the basis of oral remarks of
the Secretary of State and the Cheirman, Atomic Energy
Commission.
Deferred action on the subject until the next meeting
of the Council, at which time the report celled for
by TSC Action Ne. L1lOG-b will be presented end will
be considered together with the reference memcranda.
G.
MOBILIZATION PLANNING
(HSC Actions Nos. 1004-d and 1086-a; NSC 5414/1)
My. Cutler pointed out the three alternative concepts of
mobilization planning which hed been discussed in the NSC Flanning
Board.
Since these diecussions had concluded, Dr. Fleming had pre-
pared a new paper, which he had talked over earlier this morning
with Acting Secretary Anderson, Admirel Radferd and Mr. Cutler.
This paper had been shown to the President just pricr to the meeting,
and he had thought well of it.
Mr. Cutler then asked Dr. Flenming
to describe this paper.
tr. Flemming reed bis paper to the Council, and pointed
Gut in conclusion that he believed it met the situaticn.
(Copy of
his paper ie attached.)
Seeretary Andersen said that he hed nsthins to add tc
te. Fleming's statement except to point out that he shared Dr.
Flemming's feeling that 1f we got into ene of the situaticne described, we would want the power and authority to mcve ehead in
mobilizing just as rapldly as the circumstances dictated.
The President said that of course what we wanted was to be
absclutely ready with our mcebilization measures. On the other hand,
we did not want to do anything that would scare reorle in advence.
Accerdingly. fr Flemming's solution seemed to provide the most satisfactory answer.
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The President said that plans mst be mede in advance so
that the econony would not go wild at the first signs of an international crisis. Secretery Humphrey expressed his emphatic agreement, and pointed out that even such newspaper talk as was now current, regarding the possibility of U. S. intervention in the Indochina war, was preducing strong demands that the United States
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