532 RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL] boxes to provide them with shade and protection from the wind (Figure 10-35).40 Coconuts and pandanus were transplanted in the open in areas prepared byrototilling copra pellets into the soil (Figure 10-36).4! Transplanting of coconut and pandanusseedlings on the four southerp islands began in early June 197942 and continued into late March 1980.43 The planting program encountered the commonagricultural problems of heat, drought, and insects. In August 1979, heavy infestations of army wormsappeared in the plantations on Japtan and Ananij. An entomologist summoned from Kwajalein Atoll recommended continued use of NORTHERN ISLAND PLANTING RECOMMENDATION: 1978 The discovery in early 1978 that the Bikinians were experiencing unexpectedly high intakes of strontium and cesium from eating locally grown coconuts and other foods was disturbing to the agencies involved in the Enewetak Rehabilitation Program. The levels were attributable to the Bikinians drinking and eating more coconut than predicted in the diet on which the Bikini Atoll cleanup and resettlement was based. The Enewetak cleanup and rehabilitation plans were based on the same diet assumptions mm Pee malathion spray which provedeffective in protecting the plants. *4 and on planting coconuts on six northern islands where fission products also were found in measurable concentrations. The Bikini experience cast a shadow of doubton the Enewetak diet model, predicted exposurelevels, and island use plans. , The matter was discussed during the 4 May 1978 conference at DN Headquarters and was examined in a study by Field Command.4> The AEC Task Group Report in 1974 had indicated that coconuts could be grown on the six northern islands, assuming that any plutonium concentrations over 400 pico curies per gram (pCi/g) would have been removed.*6 Based on this radiological assessment, the Enewetak Master Plan and the EIS prescribed that these islands would be cleaned and rehabilitated for agricultural use. Cleanup offission products on anyisland was excluded in the EIS, as this would require excessive soil removal. After the Bikini experience, it appeared that the Department of Energy (DOE) might not recommendplanting the six islands until fission product levels had been reduced by natural decay or as a by-productof transuranic cleanup. This development created problems for H&N, whose fixed-price delays would be costly, expecially if they required islands.47 pr requested, on 4 August 1978, DOE’s recommendations on planting these we remobilization of a logistics base. To resolve this question, H&N formally Saw ale substantial Tr contract with AIC-Pacific included planting the six northern islands. Any _