million total cost. A review of the study by H&N and POD op
September 1974 revised the cost estimates upward to $57.3 million to coy,
crater containment of contaminated scrap and soil, increased cog, of
runway repair, replacement soil for Aomon and Enjebi, marine Craft
radiological monitoring, and decontamination. They indicated that these
costs could be reduced to $42.5 million by elimination ofhelicopte,
support, use of foreign labor, use of temporary camps on the outer islands
and other means.!74 The escalation was disturbing since DNA had bee,
advised by Congressional staff members that more austere cost estimates
were required. When DNAso advised the Corps of Engineers,!75 the
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RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATQ
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revised the scope of work to bring the cost estimate to $43.2 million.17%6
After discussions with DNA, POD submitteda further revised estimateof
$39.9 million for cleanup, based upon DNA’s financing runwayrepair and
other base camp rehabilitation work with other funds.!77 However,this
estimate lacked essential detail, and it was apparent that the contracting.
out concept wasin difficulty.
Meanwhile, suggestions had been made in the Field Command
Enewetak Planning Group that the only feasible means of reducing
MILCONcosts drastically enough to meet Congressional guidance was
through use of military labor. COL Esser proposed that Army engineer
troops be used, while Mr. Thomas Flora suggested use of Navy
Construction Battalion (Seabee) personnel. On 24 December 1974,Field
Command recommended to DNA that troops be used to reduce MILCON
costs for the cleanup project!78 and, subsequently began refining the
concept. It seemed probable that engineer troops from the U.S. Army
Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH) would be selected. Since the U.S.
Armyhadnot officially been assigned that responsibility, Field Command
could not contact that organization directly. The Pacific Support Office of
Field Command’s Logistics Directorate, which had been working with
PODonthe contracting-out concept, was tasked to work with USASCH on
an informal basis to identify probable military personnel and materiel
requirements, as well as those USASCH resources which might be
available for the project. In late 1974 and early 1975, the Pacific Support
Office was augmented by three Armyofficers to assist in planning and
initiating the project. They were Colonel Howard B. Thompson,
Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Kavanaugh, and Major William Spicuzza.
At a general planning conference in Anaheim, California, on 13-15
January 1975, COL Esser advised the other agencies of Field Command’s
intention to study the use of troops to accomplish the Enewetak Atoll
cleanup. TIPI and H&N representatives discussed the problems of
rehabilitation and resettlementat Bikini Atoll as well as Enewetak matters.
Mr. Dennis McBreen, Marshall Islands District Planner, presented the
Ujelang Field Trip Report. The dri-Enewetak there had generally accepted
ae