ye” Ss There is a document entitled “principal areas of gain to the U. S. if weapons tests are resumed and proposed schedule of actions and tests" with no identifiable author but apparently it was not written in DMA . since there is a stamp on the back that says it was received by DMA. The document addresses various aspects of a resumption of testing. It notes at the outset that it appears necessary for the U.S. to be able to carry out such a program of testing that a scheduled release of public announcements be made which would permit the AEC and DoD to make all the required advance preparations. Then there is a good deal of discussion of the gains which the U.S. can expect from testing: pure fusion weapons including very lightweight weapons, yield to weight ratio, weapons effects particularly as they pertain to anti-ICBM systems, and proof testing of new weapons entering stockpile. The study goes on to present the recommended sequence of events assuming a decision is made to resume testing. First of all would come an announcement that the preparation for testing has been ordered by the President. The suggestion that such a disclosure be made to the public immediately is based on the fact that "ground work was laid in the United States reply (released June 17th) to the Soviet aide-memoire." A suggested text of the announcement follows. "The Soviet may be testing. They consistently reject treaty provisions which could give reasonable assurance that they are not testing. The security of the free world requires the United States not to permit the Soviets to acquire an advantage by testing while the United States does not test. The U.S. will continue to negotiate in Geneva. There is still time for the Soviets to agree to reasonable proposals. The United States is preparing sites for underground tests involving no danger from fallout. Whether the U.S. actually tests will depend on events in the ucxt few weeks." Further this study feeis that the announcement should be made public rather than kept secret for two reasons: one, that such a public disclosure is consistent with past policy and probably the news could not be suppressed anyway, and two, that such an announcement is consistent with other steps being taken in light of the impending Berlin crisis. It stressed that what is recommended is a decision being made public that test preparations are being made but that in fact the carrying out of tests is a decision to be made at a later date. Following the public announce- ment that test preparations were to be made, such preparations would follow. Assuming that conditions have not materially changed, .probably in August according to this study and only shortly before the first test, an announcement should be made that testing will be resumed, with the first series underground involving no danger from fallout. The study further recommends that the U. S. not ever commit itself in any of these public statements to refraining from tests in any environment but that we should retain our freedom of action should the Soviet Union test in other environments or should the tests become necessary. A 3 July memo from Col. Anderson of DMA to Mr. Luedecke, the AEC General Manager, notes the discussions with the JCAE on the subject of parallel efforts with weapons test resumption and continuing the Vela uniform tests that have been planned for. There seems to be a strong feeling on the JCAE that the Vela uniform series be carried out as planned with the foreign observers as planned.