37 the spectrum measurements in such areas as x-ray and neutron outputs, which is often required by the DOD. He goes into some detail on what he feels is the proper definition of the weapons effects responsibility which the DOD does in fact have, and makes the following statements: ''We believe the AEC should understand these words to mean the effects which are caused by the use of nuclear weapons on systems or things of DOD interest, for example structures, communication, etc. The effects of nuclear weapons on nuclear weapons are an AEC responsibility as is the determination of the actual eminations coming out of the detonating nuclear system. The latter should not be considered to be a "weapon effect.'' It is also important that the AEC ascertain whatever it canabout the phenomena associated with nuclear explosions whether of immediate interest to the DOD or not." Dr. Bradbury also discusses the theoretical role of DASA as a collection and sorting agency for the various services within the DOD and feels that the AEC should have no objection to them acting as such but sort of wistfully wishes that they in fact could act as such instead of having the various contractors and services come directly to the AEC and the labs in so many cases. A30 A letter from Commissioner Leland Haworth to Mr. Bundy, the President's special assistant for national security affairs on 15 Dec. addresses the advantages to be gained by having Christmas Island available for the test series. The summary of the letter reads ''To summarize, the availability of Christmas Island by Jan 1962 for the coming series of tests would be highly advantageous in that it would permit the conduct of a more extensive more carefully instrumented, and operationally simpler program with greater assurances of attainment of test abjectives. Even if use in this series were limited by shortage of time, gvailability for subsequent series could be of great importance. However, e¥é“rigorous restrictions imposed by the British, particularly on the content of the test series or on our freedom of control, could largely, or even completely, nullify the potential advantages." Mr. Haworth concentrates some length in his letter on the subject of the desirability of having the island base for the most accurate and proper diagnosis and output measurements of the tests themselves. He makes a very strong point as to the need for a fixed base and at most desirable a land base for diagnostic instrumentation to carefully pinpoint its position and also the desirability of having the detonation carefully located and he compares the use of Christmas Island either in conjunction with airdrops or in some cases balloon tethered shots to the diagnostics problems with having an open ocean series where the devices would be either airdropped or on ships in some cases and the instrumentation would Bay;largely either shipbased or airborne. See (Prrningner- pats L&De f DEC of A 16 Dec. TWX from Foster to Gen. Betts on the Vine of the gray area between AEC and DOD responsibilities states the following: ‘Specifically my understanding is that the AEC has responsibility for warhead design and output, including blast, x-rays, neutrons, and gamma rays. The ''gray area" is the transmission of these effects. The DOD responsibility is the response of military equipment and personnel to these effects. This position seems adequately covered in Starbird's letter to Dr. Brown, Director, LRL, on Nov. 23, 1960." Foster goes on to say that he doesn’t feel there is a gray area involved in the request for LASL to make a measurement on the radiation produced by the warhead being questioned here, as weil as he feels there is no question on the 1000-kilometer shot which he feels are both appropriate experiments for the AEC to perform if it so desires.