e yo is aia ; a — monitess wm the resovery alesiong. During the call of 1943, s@- tected individvals ‘sow each project group sttended a ghort rud+ safs voursa ompducted by [TG 7.1 at she b-G, destined vo quality the dudividvais as monitors. In widition to + » individual peu fest monitors, £0 7.1 had available in the fermed sroe a limited number of fulietiges monitore, Within TV.}S headquarters, ons offer wes designated to monitor and coordiuals all radesais matters, md reascnoaoly, accurate dowage rscords on all persoras) were mititained, The high levels cf contanlration which reoulted frou aevoral of the shots, together vith the nesesaity for free qusat untry ints eortaminuated arcas te services ouctoment durisg thu long deley vericds between shots, coed a saericua oreblem to Sontrold of maximum poraissaible exnoswrea for crolaot paracnnel. iYferte were made to ratate personnel whenersr ccssitie, however, it wig neseusary to raqueat watwer of the Meximun Personnel Txpc- gars (M22) ta the cass of several project personnel. in yonoral, the uystem of placing monitoring responsibdil‘ties on the intiviual project groups worked very catisractorily, ($} Roll-up Astivitisa, began a8 g.on ae Shot § was fired at Bikini. Rellew istivittes Participation in Brot @ at «misgetak wera cether ilmited aué ali instrumentetion nad Lcen raady approxiaately tarse weeks srior to ths aotual shct date. it ws, therefore, poast>lea to utilise the time between ~not 6 and Shot $ for ceport writing aod ralieu; praparaticrs, [6 expedits eubmiesica of prellsainary reperts, many orojeata wore directud to inoluds cnily the data fromtre “iret five giota in vheiz preiiminary reports, After Shot 6 was itred, aporoninatsly one vea’c was required to complete werk in the forward area for e.1 but a <¢w projects. Headquartarg of TU<13 ceparted on 19 May, Seaviang on@ .ifioer to assiat in Pinal roll-up which was gonpletsd vn 2&8 May 1954. 8. EAPO? Activitias a. the C9, Development oi High alt‘tuce cavice (1) (mn 7 May 1984, the Chiel, AFIT, authorlesd Meld Command, to take such action es was uscesrary to in- ylonent the design aad procurenent of a tert davice te meet the rem qairgnents ‘Ter the high altitude shot of Operation TEAFOR. The Cu, | ~551-