10 the Compact Continued fran Page 3 vnaergy Commitree which will have primary “esponsibility within the Senate for legisative approval of the Compact and related wireements. Apparently, permanent denial wes first sought but eventually the 100-year seriod was thought to be permanent enough. One of the important features of an agreement of free associaticn in United vations usage is that the freely associated State be in a position to unilaterally terminate the arrangement. An arrangement that can be terminated by the giving of notice is more likely to regarded as "free." This power of termination is somewhat hedged in the Compact by the modification that, in the event of unilateral termination, the security and defense powers of the U.S. continue up ro the end of the intial 15-year life of the Compact, or for any furtier period mutually agreed upon. Compact shall continue in effect for a term of 100-years" and suitable payments shall be negotiated. 50 or 100 years is a much longer and arguably more burdensome period than fifteen years. It has been suggested by Beiauan sources that what is really being guaranteed in years 51-100 is a kind of neutrality for Belau whereby thcre is no U.S. military use and no other country may use the territory militarily either. If this is the case, it seems strange that there are specific references to the environmental protection provisions and to the Joint Committee (for disputes) which presuppose some continued U.S. military activity. Realistically speaking, the 50-year period is primarily cosmetic. It seems mlikely that it is really contemplated that the United States presence would terminate after that time if the U.S. wished it to continue. Again, whether this part of the deal can pass muster at the United Nations is open to speculation. There is no specific mention of this type of military arrangement in any of the relevant resolutions of the U.N. dealing either generally with the concept of free association or with free asso- While there is no direct United Nations prececent on peint and the natter is not free fFrem doubt, the extension to the 15-year period is probably not sufficiently burdensone to invalidate the arrangement as far as the U.N. is concerned. Article IX of che Militarv Use Agreement raises substan- tially more doubt about whether as a practical matter Belau woulda be free to terminate the Agreement unilaterally or whether it ie so securely locked in to the Military Agreement with the U.S. that it does not have any freedom of action within a reason~ able period. Article IX provides that the acreement is to remain in force for a term of 50 years. 26 It goes on to provide that, notwith- tanding the 50-year life of the agreement, article VI of Title Cne (the environmental rretection provisions of the Compact) and sections 311(b) (2) (Denial), 351 (Joint -ormdittee for dealing with cisputes over “.curdty and Defense matters) 354(b) (the nited States promise to respond in case of uh armed attack on Belau) and 454(a) (U.S. oremise cf continuing interest in promoting ‘conomic development in Belau) of the ciation in a particular territory. The only free association arrangements specifically approved by the U.N. are those between New Zealand on the one hand and the Cook Isiands and Nive on the other. Neither of those arrangements have anything con-. parable to this aspect of the United States- Belau Ag~eement. Either of those states may unilaterally terminate their arrangement at any time, including New Zealand's "respon- sibility" for their security and defense. There is no limit in those arrangements of any kind of denial or a continuing military relationship after termination. Assessing the propriety of the free association agreement under U.N. norms involves assessing all relevant factors to determine the extent to which it is really "free." Tt seems likely that some United Nations members will look verycosely at the 50- and 100-year periods with the suspicicn that in the total context they make it extremely difficult for Belau to exercise freely its right to terminate the relationship. In short, the long term denial pro- visions do not enhance the chances of U.N. approval of the arrangement.