Co aaa We were impressed by the broad range of Laboratory objectives, and by their realistic formulation in relation to military utilization, which are indicative of the great strength and maturity of this Labora- tory, Although many formidable technical problems in the forward-looking program remain to be solved, particularly in the small weapon field, the prognosis for continued success scems favorable, Yo Par Livermore. We were impressed by the detailed diagnosis of the Bae shot at CASTLE as presented by Dr’. Teller, This diagnosis - cep ad Pee is not only an excellent job in itself but also showed the presence. of able people at the Laboratory, which augurs well for the success of ~ their program for the Class "D" two-stage weapon. J -DrOp vestigation of small weapons utilizing the was presented by Dr. York. [RRReee snes This technique may provide ‘an 6 ternative to the gun or assembly methods and is therefore interest-— ing to explore, ; bid a tt See See z as There was expressed in the Committee a certain concern with the program as a whole, particularly in the light of the altered two-stage weapon situation. Although no specific suggestion on the program is. -~ offered, it was felt that some thought should be given to a firm assignment of responsibility and authority to a full-time director of the Livermore Laboratory which may result in a more crisp program and a more effective sharing of weapon responsibility with LASL.- (d) Test programs--TEAPOT, WIGWAM, Post-TEAPOT, and REDWING, We do not’ wish to comment on specific items of the test program at the present time since the plans may still be subject to drastic change. However, it is very gratifying that even after the numerous advances of the last years there are so many items which are worthy of the effort and expense involved in weapon tests, This may be an appropriate time again to emphasize the importance and value-of the test programs. (e) Weapons Development Philosophy. The proposal by Dr. Bradburyof a philoscphy to guide weapons development over the next years, we believe, _ deserves particular attention. In the period of scarcity of materials and limited numbers of weapons, interchangeability of nuclear parts was an important criterion of stockpile weapons design. The present is a ‘period of transition -- from scarcity to relative abundance, from a modest range of yields to one almost without limit from very small to jwery large. Interchangeability should no longer dominate design if it restricts numbers of weapons, their readiness and flexibility of use in time of emergency, or their effectiveness in accomplishing the specific missions assigned. We would, therefore, urge a careful reappraisal of the relations between the types of design of nuclear weapons and the missions for which they are appropriate, with the objective of establishing guidance principles for optimizing the design of the several classes of weapons, small and large, which could accomplish these missions. In such a reappraisal, both LASL end Sandia should take part with the oot Military Departments in the necessary comprehensive system studies. 4 oNee, om, paratte OS re atety ‘ on