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General Estes (Cont'd)
missions
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11 March 195%
The photo mission did not interfere with the control
.
ad. The directions to the sampling pilots were properly
given end skillfully executed. It would be preferred if directions
could be given primarily with reference to right or left of the
clouds! eonsolidated center area as seen from the RB-36's position.
General vectors micht be used to help clerify these directions
with the unierstanding thet such vectors heve considerable error.
@. The internal euvironment on the R5-36 was suitable
with the excaption of front on the windows to the reer of the
coe: lot's position. This condition caused me €o try to lock
around the co-;llot, an ection which wes haerardous to the op*ration of the aircreft. It is requested thet the windows on the
co-rilot's side on the R36, as well as on both sides of FL~26
No. 1083, be fitted with the double winiow arranrenent presently
used on tne feC's side of the RBe26,. This erransenent was
=
extrenely effective in preventing frost formetione
2
f. The trainine of the pilots in radesafety and
monf{torins procefures vas in fsenorel adezuste to eacomrlish the
mission. Only one pilot reed the radiation rate instruments
in his aireraft with a decimel
point error, emi only one failed
to ©-erete his gas samplins equipnente
Ze
The special communications facilities furnished in
he
With no intent to carp at en excallent result, I
the K-36 wera excellent,
would like to suzzest that TG 7.4 micht hove accomplished some
of the minor requirements such as special coummications, defrosting fittinzs, etce, before moving to ths forward aren.
Delayed imstalletion in this case gave neither commmicetions
nor visibility carebtlity in the Pry fim of 10 February 1954.
Visitility cacabllity wes not esteblished until a modificstion
was mede on 25 Fesruary for a March 1 shot date -- with no
chance for flizht teste
Fortunately, this modification wes
very successful in eliminating frost. Such delays cause her:ssmont with details in a period when time for them cannot well be
spared.
4. It was perhaps a deficiency on my pert thet the Wh-29
remained unier Eoun'‘ary Tare's (CIC) eontrol so lonz after zero
tine.
.
It hed been intended to have Wilson I com: under our
control et ebout 4415 minutes for what essentielly was to be a
mission of opportunity. Apparently, I hed not conveyed this
destre effectively. Bouniary Tare's direction to the WbD-29 were
proper uniter the conditions en! this aircraft performed its
mission successfully.
F LOPIED/DOF