ra
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the security treaty. Also, the government {8s not unmindful
of political advantages demonstrating independence from the US.
10, In these matters whether we deal with strong or weak
government in Japan, we are involved in the heart of the probles
of Japan's national survival in the nuclear age.
Neutralissr
in Japan will vary in dtrect propontion to the conclusion
Japanese leaders reach a. '.o whether relationship with the us
can provide, more than any other course of Jap nese action,
defense and security in a . er’od when both US and USSR pousess
thermonuclear weapons, Th ultimate significance of the
FUKURYU MARU incident w * hus be first whether we can devise
@ defense strategy for .apa.'s cecurity in the light of enornous
“ew comp]*’.cations that 1954 -hermonuclear test series bts estadwished and then whether we can persuade a much stronger Japanese
government that our nlanning has solved the problem to th> extent
it can be solved.
11, Many of the conclusions above are patently serious,
This, of course, does not of itself mean we should draw in‘ our
iines but rather that certain realities with which we have to
live are now more apparent.
I look forward to discussing this
further when I am in Washington.
ALLISON
~6-
.
Department of Frpy
Historian's Office
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