USsbrerep
a
cover of any kind is available or c&an be provid
secondary movement is feasible.
A Weighing of
unless rapid
rplative risks may
suggest the selection of destinations for evacueks in areas where
some fallout is probable rather than to attempt
more radical
movement in the hopes of escaping the pattern completely.
This
consideration would be especially valid in populipus areas where
there is danger of overlapping fallout patterns,
B. Shelter and Cover
1. Programs for the construction of home
fhelter and the
selection and marking of shelter areas as outlingd in T™ 5-1,
™ 5-5 ("Shelter from Atomic Attack" - Part 1, agd "Home Shelter
for Family Protection”) should be completed espedially in target
areas, along escape routes, and within satellitefcommunities.
In
the event that warning is insufficient to permit
lives can be saved by taking shelter and by util
decontamination measures until such time as pers
area.
The shelter program is no longer a city a
reception area
program; it i8 a general program since almost nofArea is free from
some threat from fallout contamination.
e. Beyond the range of probable blast and
such “cover” as is available should be used.
Tha
thermal effects,
best protection
from residual radiation is that which places the
bccupants farthest
removed from the fallout particles on the ground
nd roofs of
buildings and which places the greatest amount off
dense material
between the occupants and the radioactive materi
basements of homes, lower floors, of barns which
Examples are
y have thick
stone or masonry walls, cyclone cellars, caves, ahd tunnels,
Within each the most protected area or spaces shobld be designate3.
Test data
indicate
that the
radiation level.
indoors
on
the
first floor of an ordinary frame house would be about one-half the
level out of doors.
Greater protection would be
wy
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DOE ARCHIVES
.