Force and Navy. Each group brought its own standing operating procedures (SOP's) and methods, Thus, within a matter of days, each group and in- dividual had to conform to set patterns and procedures of the entire Task Force. That these procedural differences were corrected in such a short time was regarded as one of the most heartening aspects of the rehearsal. Mechanical and equipment failures were located during TIGER/CAT, thus giving both the Air Force and Navy nearly three months to cope with such problems prior to moving to the Forward Area. The largest area of discrepancies brought out by TIGER/CAT involved communications and equipment aboard the Command Ship (USS ESTES) and the RB-36 control aircraft, These discrepancies concerned the antiquated and outmoded é radar scope and very high frequency (VHF) equipment on the USS ESTES, and the lack of high frequency (HF) equipment and adequate identification, friend or foe (IFF) range on the RB-36. For instance, aboard the USS ESTES the use of one VHF channel would leak across to several other VHF channels rendering reception on those channels impossible. channels were thus inoperative. Several On one occasion during an emergency, D channel could not be remoted to the control room for fifteen minutes. It was also learned that three radar scopes were not slave-box equipped. These discrepancies necessitated the ESTES putting in at San Diego for corrective action. After a thorough study of rehearsal results, General Estes noti-~ fied Task Group 7.3 (Navy) that he would like to send six F-84's and their pilots back to San Diego Naval Air Station between 10 and 20 December for a retest of Command Ship commmications, as well as to ru the pilots through the ground control interception (GCI) again prior to overseas movement. AMWi/ He Ji. 3