f % s A carefulanalysisof clearancestatisticssupportsthe conclasion that all personnelwho actuallyrequiredaccessto AEA Restricted Data to perfom theirnissionduringOperationSANDSTONEhad a “Q” clearance. Personnelclearancetargetdateswere met. d. Dispositionof >ro:atory Cases. All assigningagencies had been requestedby CJTF-7in October,19~7, to screenthe personnel recordsof individualsbeing consideredfor duty with the Joint Task Force in orderto eliminatepoor securityrisksbeforeactual. assignment to JTF-7. Nonetheless, a moderatenunberof derogato~ caseswere developedduring the course of investigation initiated~ J-2. “Qn Clearances* In 68%of the “Q” type investigations initiatedby the Joint Task Force,the AEC granted full clearancewithoutcement. In approximately 30% of the cases,the clearancewas givenbut J-2’s attentionwas invitedto derogatoryinformationcontainedin the reportof investigation.For the balanceof 2%, “Q” clearancewas withheldpending J-2 recommendations. As a resultof theseprocessesof re+iewof evaluation of ‘C!”investigations, 28 individualswere removed from the Task Force as securityrisks. Of these,20 uere separatedfor reasonsof characterand 8 removedbecauseof Comnunistaffiliations. 2. - ‘P” Approvals. 10 individualswere deniedclearance as a resultof derogatoryinformationcontainedin 25 SectionII 3 ,. --.,.