MT ● ‘--g which would be usefulin shorteningthe road to the llltimate anwer. b. Capabilitiescf.the PotentialEnemy was no intelligence evailableto J-2 (1) Acts of TJar. ‘i’here which indicatedwith any degreeof probabilitytbt nussia,her satel~ites or ?nv otherpowerwould undertakeat this tine an attack;.n force againstelementsof the Task Force. Militaryundertakingslikely to resultpresentlyin a formalstateof war would most probablybe avoided. Notwithstanding the stateof politicalunrestin the world, currentAmericanleadershipin the fieldof atomicarmamentsseemedto offer a powerfuldeterrentto nationswho would otherwisebe uninhibited in pursuingtacticsof aggression. (2) Acts Shortof War. ~Tnd~rt&@S of a cl~dest~e nature calculatedto obtainneeded scientificor engineeringintelligence informationfor a competin~power or to ascertainthe true state of Americanpro~ressin the developmentof at~c weaponsmeritedhich place in the scaleof ralativeprobability.On a not greatlylwer level of likelihoodwould be the operationsof an unfriendlynation designedto retarddevelopmentof atomicweaponsby the sabotageof key experimentsand operationsundertakenat greatcost to our Government. In order of theirrelativeprobability,lines of actionopen to an unfriendlypowerwere estimatedby J-2 to be as follows: (a) Reconnaissance Observationsin the operationalarea conducted~: ~. Sutiarnneswith or withoutsmalllandingparties. ~. Surfacevessels. SectionII . . ., .<’ 9