CFAPTERII Intelligence Planningand Operations 10 InitialEstimateof the Situation a. The PotentialEnemy Throughoutthe planningphases of OperationSANDSTONEin the fall of 1947, the march of,eventsin the world followeda familiar pattern. The UnitedStatescontinuedto upholdthe cause of demcracyand to work for a just and lastingpeace. Theseaims, in conjunctionwith maintatitigour nationalsecurity,mightbe said to have constitutedour postwargrand strategy. Russia,on the otherhand, was seekingto extendher sphereof influencebeyondthe territorial gainsagreedupon at the Yalta conference. Indaed$she had been on the strategicoffensivefor some time,whereasthe UnitedStatesand Great Britainhad been on the strategicdefensive. Recently,however,we had assumedthe strategicinitiativein Turkeyand @eece. Althoughreducedfrom a wartimepeak of 10,000,000to an apprcmimate strengthof 2,600,000men, the SovietAmy had becomethe wo~ldts most powerfulmilita~ force. Russiatsnavy on 1 October1947,was estimatedto comprise600jO00men. In its complementof combatvessels at that time were 252 to 27& submarinesof tich ~ (ex~e=) dis-” placed719 to 769 tonswhile surfacedand were fittedwith schnorkel. Russ~~s F= ~stern Fleet was believedto have its main base at Vladivostokand to be canprisedof the followingprincipalships;2 heavy cruisers,15 to 17 destroyersand 102 to 108 submarines. The RussAir Forcewas known to have in operationB-29tsbuilt from u.S. models 9 SectionII :’t, *,4.*=