merely as a pool from whichto draw this qualified~rsonnel for
attachmentto Task Groupswhen commanderswere responsiblefor the
securityof the WC Restrictedmaterial. As an example,the security
of the Zero Islandswag a responsibility
of CTG 7.2 and he was prOvided some TG 7.5 personnel for this job. Therewas somewhatof
tendencyto go aroundCTG ‘7.2and deal dtiectlywith this guard
detachment,J-2 or, CTG 7.5. Orders shouldbe more explicitin
settingforththe commandchannel.
7. The MilitaryEchelon of JTF-7 was provided to support the
ScientificZchelon. Thus the basic plan was that of the scientists,
and other operational plans and o@ers had to stem from it. The Test
Director knew the scientific requirements which the military operations
permitting,the Test Director
personnel did not. Other considerations
and J-3 might well be the sam individualand resultin savingthis
lost motion. This does not eliminatethe need of a scientific or $est
task group (TG 7.1) under a Scientific Director as commander.
8.
tiy projects which are Whnatelyconn
ectedwith
the explosion
of the bomb, such as the long range detection program, should be placed
under the control of the Task Force Comander.
9. At least the planning echelons of all Task Group staffs
should be established in close physical proximity to each other snd
the Task Force Staff from the very beginning of the operation.
Liaison should then be maintafied by means of frequent trips between
~ach planning echelon snd its main headquarters.
SectionIII
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