. . ..
8~pling8 of Amerioan
of the tests. Andyais of representative
newspaperreportsdisclosesthat the preaaneitherapproximatedthe
exaot datesof the te8t8nor aumised their exaotnature.
4. SecurityControlof Communications
a. Communications
8ecuritycontrolpolicie6 and procedures
that
producedeffectivere8ult8. It ia believedhighly‘ianlikely
advanceinformationoonoerningthe datea of the variouatestswas
obtainedby foreigncommunications
intelligenceanalyats. %porta
from monitoringagenciesand the Army SecurityAgenoy,arrangedby
J-2, consistentlyindicatedthat no significantleakagesof olassifled informationrelativeto Operation SANTBTONEoocurred.
b. The in-the-cleartime signalsconstituteda definite
menaoe to the securityof the time of the tests,however,theywere
acceptedas a calculatedsecurityriskwhich WMI fir outweighedby
the personnelsafetyfaotorsand the soientifiotest requirements
involved. Monitoring stations at Guam and Hawaiiwere unabletQ
read these signals.
O* VRF circuitswere widelyused and were monitoredwithin
JTF-7 on a spot-cheekbasis for the purposeof maintainingthe
securitystandardsof informationpassedthereon. The limitednange
I
and i ’regular,sporadicskip featuresof this type of oircuitfur-
S/
ni ed a reasonable degree of security.
&
D. Roll-Up
1. The redeploymentof TG 7.5 operationaland J+ staffpersonnel
SeotionII
7s
MiiaRm