were no incident8involving espionage, sabotage, or aub~er$ion in
connectionwith the operationsof the Task Force.
c. CounterintelligencePlanning and Operations
10 SecurityControlof Personnel
a. The extensivepersonnel8ecurityclearance program established for Operation SANDSTONE required that all individuals
assigned to or associated with JTF-’7receive an ay?ropriate ClearanCe
by the 13,000 individuals were so cleared, of whom more than IWO
reoeived a ‘Qn clearance which was based upon a full background
investigation by the FBI and approved by the Atomio Energy Commission.
Of tk.eoverall total screened, only 38 persons were denied clearanoe
one thirdhad
and access to the projeat; of these,approximately
Communistaffiliations,
the remainderbeingremovedfor charaoter
reasons.
be
The ‘Q” clearanceproce8s,which is requiredby the
AtomicEnergyAct of 1946,is time consumingand, in order to meet
deadlinesfor the early use of key personnel, resort was made to
emergenoy ‘Qn clearances with successful results. In general, delays
in ‘Qn olearing members of Joint Task Force Seven were beyondTa8k
Force Control.
c. The per80nnelseourityclearancesfor individualsassigned
to collateralprojectswere, for convenience,processedthroughthe
J-2 Sectionof Headquarters,
JointTask Foroe Seven,and causedsome
“Section
II
74