.
-.
to their home station or community. They were also instructed to report
to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any inquiries by suspicious strangers concerning Operation SANDSTCNE. These
briefings were made the responsibility of the commandingofficersof
the units and ships.
2.
Estimate of the Leska~e Situation
a.
Personal Correspondence. In the absence of formal censor-
ship, there was no opportunity to conduct an overall evaluation of the
extent to which OperationSANDSTONEwas discussedin privateletters.
However, security officers in all ships and units received numerous
inquiries from conscientious correspondents who appeared anxious to
apply correctly JTF-7 tiformationsecurityregulations. Such questions
were so numerousand widespreadas to justifythe conclusionthat the
seedsof the indoctrination
efforthad fallenon fertileground. Incomingtravelers from the mainlandreportedthat the publicand the
militaryestablishment
were, so far as they knew, in completeignorance
of the natureof the test.
b. Press. See paragraph5, c below.
telephoneservice(AN-TRC)
c. Telephones. The ship-to-shore
at EniwetokAtoll and the internaltelephonesystemsof the major ships
and islandswere sourcesof particularconcern to J-2. iiithough
close
listeningunits of an unfriendlypower couldbe expectedto intercept
conversations(onlyif specialequipmentwere used),the opportunities
for interceptby unauthorizedlistenerswithinthe Task Force itself
were great. It is consideredtiprobablethat any significantintc”’igence
55
SectionII
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