r
10. The period
of Task Force Headquarters operation b
two
echelons shotid be reduced to the absolute mintium. Luring the last
phase of operations h
the Eor~ard sea,
the location of Headquarters,
on
JTF-7 and two of the principalsubordinatecommands’headquarters
the same ship greatlyassistedin expeditingoperationalprocedure.
Duringthe actualtests,all commandersand principaloperationalstaff
officerswere presentor representedti.a ciesignated
jointoperational
area (FlagDeck of Mt. XcKinley),thus CJTF-7had first-handand
promptinformation
of the operationsand could obtainpromptadvice
and issuepromptinstructions.In an operationsuch as this which is
essentially experimental, any sOF must be such as to permit rapid
changes in operational plans.
11 ●
The operations plan would have been a more suitable vehicle
for a task of the nature of Cperation SANDSTUNE than the Field Crder.
(In effeet the annexes to Field Order No. 1 developed tito operations
plans in this operation. The fom
used in the”operational annexes
(G & H) proved to be convenient and easily understood. L%.nychanges
had to be made snd so each item was numbered for easy reference.)
However,the JTF OperationsPlan shouldbe worded in general eno@
terms to permitflexibilityof operationaldetails without necessitating changes in the JTF OperationsPlan. J-3 must be constantly
on the alert to prevent the very exact detailed planning necessary
Plan.
in the Task Groups from appearing in the J’1’F
12 ●
A requirement for liaison aircraft was not initially
31
Section 111