agency. J-3 then forwardedrequestsfor fulf~nt
of thse recwire-
ments to the appropriateservice(&my, Navy or &
Force)for necessary
J-1 was the
action. (In the case of requirementsfor tidividuals,
responsibleJTF staffagency.) In son cases it was necessaryforJ-1
to procurepersonnelwith specificqualifications
which were then used
to fill unitswhichwere activatedat the requestof J-3, so close
coordination
betweenJ-1 and J-3 was essential. Since SANRSTOJEhad
been assignednumbertwo priorityof all projectsthen underway by the
three services,requestsfor activationor assignmentsof units were,
in general,filledpromptlyand satisfactorily.It is believed that
the successfulaccomplishment
of the Task Force missioncould only have
been assuredby such an assignmmt of a very high operationpriority.
As approvedrequirementsfor unitswere returnedthroughJ-3, the
TroopList (proposedAnnexB to the FieldOrder)began to take shape.
However,it was impossibleto completeAnnex B durtigNovemberd~ to
some delay in fillingthe Air Task Group requirementsfrom the Air
Force,where a conflictdevelopedwith the 55 Group Program,the
numberone priorityAir Force project.
AdmiralDenebrink, who had been desi~ated as Comander of the
and while
Nava3 Task Group,arrivedin Washingtonearly in l!ove~ber
there assumedcommandof &l vesselsassignedto CJ~-7.
When he
returnedto Oahu$ his Air Officer,OaptainQuackenbush,remainedin
Washhgton, and took over additionalduty as the Navy nwnberof the
J-3 Section,JTF Headquarters.
8
SectionIII
,,.
“a