fact that no press or radio correspondentswere authorized access to
tineforward areas. Such releases, acccrdin: to the original jlans
were to be made only -i;ith
the approval of the Secretary of the Defense
in each c:.se. Subsequently l.:r.
Torrest=l delegated to the ~Or3,tinder
of
of Jo:nt Task Force Seven the authority to affirm, deny, or refuse
corm.enton inquiries by the press relative to the rnilitaq aspects of
the operetion. The proposed r.lease of in:’ormaLionb:’either the Secretary
of Defense or the ,,tomicLnergy Commission was to be mutual~j coordinated.
In aiiition, the concurrence of the Secretary of State was required in
the latter case.
In view of these agreements and more particularly
because the over-all security of the operation was the direct responsibility of the Task Force Commander, his opinion was sought on all proposed rf.leasesby any of the interested government agencies.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 coordinated ~;iththe staff Public
Relations Officer in fonnulatin~ proposed Task Force policy on the
public releases for the approval of CJTF-7. J-2ts prim=y interest was
to preseme the integrity of existing categories of military classified
information. Particular attention was given to the screening out of
w
proposed n=~spaper release, the target dates for particular tests
and the generaltime of tests. Such information,if availableto a
foreignpower,would greatlyeasethe difficultiesin arrangingfor
clandestine observations. From a militaryviewpoint,it was likewise
that
deemed desirable to deny a potentialaggressorany intelligence
would be informative as to the nature of the tests. (i.e.whetherunderwater, air-dropped, guided missile,etc.) Obviously,his entirethinking at strategic levels would be hampered by the lack of reliable in-
60
.SectionII -xi