stated in effect that experiments of a military nature would be per-
mitted only when it was evident that they would not interfere with
the conduct of AEC tests.
Without attempting to minimize the in-
portance of AEC objectives, it is possible that this policy may
have been unjustifiably narrow in its intent.
Certainly, its in-
plementation was susceptible to unbalanced influence.
The fate of every
military experiment proposed for inclusion in the operation was almost inevitably determined by the opinions of individuals whose
sympathies lay with the AEC test program.
The prevalent lack of
understanding by military personnel of the scientific aspects of
such a program places them at an initial disadvantage when attempting to influence a decision in this regard.
The military commander
of an organization devoted primarily to scientific objectives is
almost compelled to defer to the judgments of the scientific members
of the organization on problems of a scientific nature.
Unfortunately,
under such a policy as the one mentioned above, it is possible for
those members to veto proposed military research even when no concrete reason for objection can be discovered.
Any weighting of the
scale of opinion in a manner which enables one source of advice to
exercise a disproportionate influence on the commander encourages
the usurpation of command prerogatives.
Before future tests of atomic
weapons are scheduled, a balance of power should be established between scientific and military interests in order that national inter~
ests may be best served.
Section VIII