+m
diaries, letters and various office memoranda.
As each officer gained
more information, he was able to talk more intelligently about these
problems, other officers were less reluctant to brief him on how to get
the work done.
This may be a severe criticism of a system, but it points
up the seemingly irreconcilable nature of the eternal conflict of interest
between operational objectives end security restrictions.
d.
Staff Conferences.
|
The Air Commander was aware of the situation new officers faced
in getting information needed to do their work, so a daily staff conference
was instituted for the Office of the Air Commandert?+&very afternoon at
1600, members of the staff assembled and reviewed the work of-the day.
Each officer was given the opportunity to tell what:hehad learned, and
how his own work was progressing.
This close association and exchange of
information broadened the viewpoint of each officer.
Information that was brought to these meetings was gathered .from
many sources.
In the daily contacts of staff.members with other officers
‘in Joint Task Force SEVEN, items of interest were assimilated, and when
put together at the staff douferences with other relevant items, an
integrated picture began to develop.
The Air Commander attended many of
these meetings and because of his broad knowledge of the whole project was
able to provide the "missing links” that were necessary to have a complete
understanding of the problem at hand.
|
The tri-weekly staff conferences at Headquarters, Joint Task Force
SEVEN were attended by General Kepner in his capacity as Deputy.
Colonel ;
Grills (assistant to the Commander, Air Forces) and one or two other officers onm%bhe staff of the Air Commander also attended these conferences.
SostfOn“¥ITT
19