7,3 the wavy, 7.4 tne Air corce, and 7.5 the contractors (primarily from tue firm of uolmes and Narver) and Department of Defense people. Tae Joint Task Force concept vas one originated for the Able and saker tests at Bikini Atoll in ly4o and was continued thereafter. {t had been proven the most effective and efficient way of combininz technical Know-now, military and security interests and an equitaple sharing of the knowledge resulting from such tests. CY Upon the shoulders of the Task Force Commander, and tne heads of the five segments of the Force _— rested tie responsibility for tne safety of all personnel and the successful execution of the tests. of iarcen 1, Sometime in tne -arly morning hours 1954, iaformation was received concerning the status of the suips, personnel and security surrounding 5,000 square wile zone wuicit extended from 109 15' to 12° 45' north latitude and from 160° 35' to loo? 1lo' east longitude. Also received was meteorological information coucerning wind ana weatuer conditions. and evaluated, After all data was received tiie decision was wade to go anead with the first test of tue 'Castle" series. ‘the code name for the sleeping giant bottled up in its steel and concrete womv was "Bravo." At one minute, or even a few seconds before 06:45 Kilo (local) time on ..arcn 1, 1954, tne tragic events which would follow "Bravo's" detonation could have been prevented, but incredibly, the decision was wade to go aiead, despite an incomplete and2 Sgnsy somewhat =: alarming report CESpitean. concerning tne winds avove Bikini.* For ".tike” shot on Enewetok in 1952 availaole wing infomnnation showed winds heading to the west from sea * See appendix for "ike" and "Bravo" wind direction charts. 70)