to the accomplishment of the duties during the operational phase in 1951 required simultaneous consideration of all requirements throughout the planning, mobilization, and performance phases. PLANNING The planning for the support of scientific operations suffered in its early stages from the paucity of available criteria. True, it was known by June of 1949 that a Task Force Group would have to be suppor= ted on Parry Island. It was also conjectured, at that time, that the major construction effort would have been largely completed by December of 1950, and that as a consequence the H & N forces required for complete support would be somewhere in the neighborhood of 400 to 600 people; however, it was not until immediately prior to overseas move- ment of Joint Task Force 3 that many of the requirements for camp operation, maintenance, and mangement were resolved, During the year and one-half preceding January 1951, the impact that the increase of construction requirements would have on Job 4 and Job 5 planning was not fully appreciated in some quarters. This situation was further complicated by the fact that firm criteria for various construction programs added to the scope of work during the course of the Project were delayed, The planning difficulties that resulted from ignoring the obvious interrelationship between construction activities and Job 4 and 5 activities may be seen in the various attempts to fix a firm estimate of cost for these two Jobs. In July of 1950, H & N submitted an oral estimate of the cost for Jobs 4 and 5, based upon information gained at meetings at Los Alamos on June 28 and 29, 1950. excess of $8,500,000. This estimate was slightly in It was drawn in the light of knowledge of the over-all picture of the Project and based upon an interpretation of the criteria available at the time, as well as knowledge of the required Magnitude and flexibility of organization which would have to play so important a part in the success of the actual test activities. However, the Korean War and its impact on Department of Defense support of activities at Eniwetok Atoll had resulted in the formulation of an operational philosophy which limited activities to the barest possible essentials. In view of this philosophy, the estimate submitted was considered to be too high, and in order to assist in properly planning and estimating for Jobs 4 and 5, a letter stating new criteria dated August 23, 1950 was directed to H & N by the AEC, The criteria established at this time were, in general, that three detonations would be effected during the 1951 tests, that the detonations would occur in order on Engebi, Aomon, and Runit, that Job 5 Work Orders would be incidental in number, and that roll-up activities would involve only a small standby crew in residence at the Military Garrison on Eniwetok. 1see Section 12, for full statement of the criteria established. 17-2